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ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF WAS
INSTRUCTION.
A.

ENTITLED

TO

A

REAR-END

COLLISION

DOCTRINE

Plaintiff Preserved The Issue For Appeal.

Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to preserve this issue
for appeal.

Defendant's Brief pp. 10-12.

Plaintiff does not

object to defendants discussion of the basic principles of law
relating to preservation of an issue for appeal, but notes that
defendant has failed to properly apply these principles to the
present case.
As stated in her primary brief, plaintiff's counsel requested
a jury instruction setting forth a rear-end collision doctrine
based upon Bullock v. Unqricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975).

This

proposed instruction reads as follows:
In most cases where one car "rear-ends" another, it
accords with common sense and experience to believe that
the following car has disregarded the duty to keep a
lookout ahead and to keep the car under control, and is,
therefore, at fault.
But such a conclusion is not
necessarily always correct.
It may depend upon the
particular circumstances.
(R. 237)

While this instruction may "[validate] common sense," as

stated by defendant, (Defendant's Brief p. 13), it also sets forth
the rear-end collision doctrine proposed by plaintiff. In essence,
it indicates that the jury may infer that the rear-ending driver is
at fault because he has failed

in his duty to keep a proper

lookout, and that such an inference or presumption is rebuttable
depending upon the circumstances.
Plaintiff requested this instruction prior to trial.

(R. 237)

Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Howard, also orally argued the merit of

this instruction before the court on his motion for directed
verdict, stating,

,f

[Y]ou can't run into the back of a vehicle

without a logical explanation," that the defendant had to make the
explanation
negligence.
position.

and,

otherwise, that

(T. 2 06)

the

inference

was

that of

The court explicitly rejected plaintiff's

(T. 215-16)

After the court instructed the jury, Mr. Howard reminded the
court that he had a directed verdict instruction which the court
had refused to give.

During the course of this conversation, Mr.

Howard stated, "The weather is something that's obvious to you and
you can arrive in accordance with it.

The fact it is snowing

doesn't eliminate the responsibility of a driver to avoid hitting
cars in front of him.

That's why I'm entitled to a directed

verdict."

The court again rejected Mr. Howard's

(T. 215-16)

argument.
Defendant suggests that plaintiff did not preserve the issue
for appeal by failing to object when the court did not include the
instruction at issue in the jury instructions.
p. 11.

Defendant's Brief

It is well settled that an attorney is not required to

pursue a clearly futile action to preserve an issue for appeal. In
the present case, the instruction had been presented to the court.
The theory behind the instruction had been argued before the court,
and had been explicitly rejected by the court. Continued argument
of the issue would have been a fruitless exercise in futility.

2

The purpose behind Utah R. Civ. P. 51 's requirement that a
party must object to the failure to give an instruction is to give
the judge a chance to address the issue and rule on it, thereby
affording him the opportunity to correct any errors made during the
trial.

"A matter is sufficiently raised if it has been submitted

to the trial court and the trial court has had the opportunity to
make findings of fact or law." James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) .

This requirement has clearly been met.

Accordingly, defendant7s argument must fail.
B.

This Presumption Raises An Issue Of First Impression, And
Is Compatible With Existing Utah Law,

The Utah appellate courts frequently consider issues of first
impresssion.

This Court has stated that it is receptive to novel

theories of law when they are supported by firm logic and have some
basis in established precedent.
(Utah

Ct.

App.

specifically

1990).

addressed

State v. Burton. 800 P. 2d 817, 819

Because
the

the

issue

Utah

of

a

courts

rear-end

have

not

collision

presumption, plaintiff is now inviting this Court to make such a
consideration.
In

this

light,

plaintiff

does

not

dispute

defendant7s

assertion that Bullock v. Unqricht, 538 P.2d at 190, from which the
proposed instruction was derived, does not set forth the proposed
presumption, but only acknowledges a "common sense" rule. That the
Court has not addressed the issue of an inference or presumption in
Bullock does not limit plaintiff from pursuing the issue.

3

Defendant argues that an instruction outlining a presumption
overemphasizes the plaintiffs case.

Defendant's Brief p. 13.

"*Presumptions' are rules based upon experience or public policy
and established in the law to assist the jury in ascertaining the
truth." Bettner v. Boring, 764 P.2d 829, 831-32 (Colo. 1988). The
instruction proposed by plaintiff does not overemphasize the
plaintiff's case but, as stated by defendant, simply "validates
common sense."

Defendant's Brief p. 13.

The proposed

doctrine

is modeled

after

the

evidentiary

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur set forth in Virginia S. v. Salt Lake
Care Center. 741 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

"The doctrine

of res ipsa loquitur applies because the plaintiff could not
reasonably be expected to account for any cause of the accident not
within his knowledge" where the accident was the sort that would
not have happened had the defendant used due care and had the
plaintiff not been negligent in causing the accident.
Bettner, 739 P.2d 884, 885 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).

Boring v.

Virginia S.

asserts that
[t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary
doctrine used in a negligence action to establish the
defendant's duty of care and the breach of that duty. To
rely on this doctrine, the plaintiff must establish a
sufficient evidentiary foundation to support application
of the doctrine and its inference of negligence.
Virginia S., 741 P.2d at 971 (citations omitted).
Defendant

also

argues

that

a

plaintiff,

under

such

a

presumption, would not have to prove her case, in contravention of
Utah law.

Defendant's Brief p. 14. This is not true.
4

Under the

proposed doctrine, which is an application of the doctrine of res
judicata, the plaintiff would have to prove the applicability of
the presumption to his or her set of facts before the jury could
consider it.

As discussed in plaintiff's brief in chief, the

plaintiff would have to show that:

(1) the accident was such that

it would not normally have occurred had the following driver used
due care; (2) that the following vehicle was, at the time of the
accident, under the management and control of the defendant; and
(3) the accident was not caused by the plaintiff's negligence.
See. Virginia S. . 741 P.2d at 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Plaintiff's
Brief

p.

22-24.

Once

the

plaintiff

established

that

the

presumption applied to his or her set of facts, he or she would
also have to prove causation. Only once the plaintiff had met this
burden would the defendant have to come forward.

Just as in the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the elements of negligence would not
be circumvented.
Defendant presents the following
consequence

should

this

Court

scenario as a possible

adopt

plaintiff's

proposed

presumption:
Such an instruction would allow a party who, after
passing a vehicle, could swerve directly in front of that
vehicle, slam on her brakes, cause a collision, and walk
into court having a burden placed upon the following
driver to present exculpatory evidence or have the jury
forced to find for the plaintiff.
Defendant's Brief p. 14. Such a scenario is not possible under the
presumption proposed by plaintiff.

In defendant's hypothetical,

the party could not carry his or her burden of showing that the
5

accident was not caused by her negligence.

In the absence of such

proof, the presumption would be inapplicable and the plaintiffs
case would fail.

The presumption, therefore, would not place the

burden of proof on the defendant in such a case.
Defendant argues that in presenting such a presumption, "the
trial court would be, in fact, instructing the jury that the mere
fact an accident happens indicates the defendant was negligent in
contradiction of Utah law."
the case.

Defendants Brief p. 14.

Such is not

The plaintiff has to first carry her burden of proof in

showing that the presumption is applicable, as discussed above.
Plaintiff does not argue with the validity or applicability of
Instruction 11 as discussed by defendant. Defendant's Brief p. 15.
Plaintiff,

however,

notes

that

the

presumption,

as

she

has

presented it, recognizes the duties set forth in this instruction
and does not conflict with them.

For the presumption to be

applicable, as discussed previously, the plaintiff must prove that
he or she did not negligently cause the accident, e.g., that he or
she is observing all the duties set forth in the instruction,
including keeping a proper lookout, driving at a safe speed for the
conditions, keeping the vehicle under proper control, following
other vehicles at a safe distance, and stopping or slowing down
suddenly only after observing that it can be done safely.
Defendant refers to Harris v. Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d
217, 221 (Utah 1983) for the proposition that if a motorist who
collides with a stationary vehicle is not guilty of negligence as

6

a matter of law and that an accident involving moving vehicles is
even less compelling, and stated that plaintiff pointed this out.
Defendant's Brief p. 16. Defendant's presentation of plaintiff's
argument

is disingenuous; plaintiff noted this case for the

proposition that the present issue had not been explicitly ruled
upon by the Utah courts so was a case of first impression, and that
the presumption does not create a per se rule that a motorist rearending a vehicle is guilty of negligence as a matter of law, but is
rebuttable and must be shown to be applicable.

Plaintiff's Brief

pp. 20-22.
For these reasons, defendant's arguments on this issue are
without merit and may be disregarded by this Court.
C.

A Presumption Of Negligence Is An Application Of The
Doctrine Of Res Ipsa Loquitur.

Plaintiff argues that the present accident "is not one of a
kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have
happened had the defendant used due care," but "arose out of
extraordinary circumstances where extreme care could have been and
was exercised by defendant, but a minor and insignificant touching
of the vehicles occurred nonetheless," making the accident the
wrong sort for the application of res ipsa loquitur.

Defendant's

Brief p. 17. Plaintiff pointed out that this was not the case, but
that the accident occurred during normal and expected winter

7

driving conditions,1 Plaintiff also provided evidence that this
"minor and

insignificant touching of vehicles" caused her a

substantial amount of damage both to her person and her vehicle.
Defendants argument is his theory of the case.
argument is her theory of the case.

Plaintiff's

Both parties presented

evidence to support their theories of the case.

Under well

established rules of litigation, once a party has produced evidence
supporting his or her theory of the case, he or she is entitled to
instructions which educate the jury upon the theory, regardless of
what the other party's theory of the case might be, and regardless
of what the jury ultimately might find. For example, "[e]ven when
a plaintiff is contributorily negligent he is still entitled to the
rear-end collision presumption instruction."
885.

Boring, 739 P.2d at

"Where there is evidence adduced to support a party's theory

of the case, it is prejudicial error for the trial court to fail to
instruct thereon."
1981).

Watters v. Ouerry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah

That the trial court deprived plaintiff of such an

instruction, after plaintiff had carried her initial burden of
proof, constitutes reversible error.
Defendant argues that "[t]he presumption argued by plaintiff
cannot be rejected by the jury and therefore is distinguishable
from Utah law." Defendant's Brief p. 18. This characterization of
plaintiff's argument is totally inaccurate.
1

Plaintiff stated:

Mr. Howard stated: "The weather is something that's obvious to you and you can arrive in
accordance with it. The fact it's snowing doesn't eliminate the responsiblity of a driver to avoid
hitting cars in front of him. That's why I'm entitled to a directed verdict." (R. 215)
8

The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does
not violate Utah's ruling against finding negligence as
a matter of law in a rear end collision because the
instruction is a means of presenting the leading car's
theory of the case to the jury, and even though the
driver may be entitled to an instruction, whether the
presumption applies is the jury's province to determine.
"When a rear-end collision instruction is given to the
jury, the jury is instructed that the presumption is
rebuttable."
Bettner, 764 P. 2d at 832.
"[0]nce the
elements of res ipsa loquitur have been established, it
merely permits and does not compel the inference of
negligence by the fact finder." Kusv, 681 P. 2d at 1235;
accord Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah 1985).
Thus, the use of the presumption instruction does not
deprive the jury of the deliberative function so highly
regarded by the Utah court.
Plaintiff's Brief p. 26.
As noted

above, both res

ipsa

presumption are evidentiary doctrines.

loquitur

and the

proposed

The similar instruction at

issue in Bettner v. Boring stated that

fl

[u]nless and until the

presumption is outweighed by evidence to the contrary which has
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you must consider
the

presumption

verdict."

with

the

other

evidence

Bettner. 764 P.2d at 831-32

in

arriving

at

(emphasis added).

your
This

merely permits and does not compel the inference of negligence by
the fact finder; it does not remove the deliberative function from
o
the

fact

finder.

This

Court

should,

accordingly,

disregard

defendant's erroneous characterizations of plaintiff's arguments.
Defendant's Brief p. 18.
Defendant finally argues that the Utah application of res ipsa
loquitur is different from the Colorado application from which
Bettner is derived, in that the Utah law only infers negligence
9

while the Colorado law presumes negligence.

Defendant's Brief p.

18. Defendant has provided no language from either the Colorado or
Utah courts to support this assertion.

In fact, the above-quoted

language from Bettner suggests that the Colorado law infers rather
than presumes negligence, also.

Because defendant's assertion is

unsupported, this Court should disregard it.
For these reasons, defendant's arguments are without merit.
D.

Under The Facts, Plaintiff Was Entitled To The Rear-End
Collision Instruction.

Defendant's characterization of Colorado law in Section I.E.
of his brief is a maze of confusion.

In one sentence, defendant

states that the "State of Colorado presumes negligence, sufficient
to make out only a prima facie case, when the following driver is
involved in a rear-end collision," but then states that "[t]he
[Bettner] court held that there was not [sic] presumption of the
defendant's negligence since colliding with the rear of plaintiff's
truck bespeaks negligence no more than colliding with the front of
it."

Defendant's Brief p. 19.

Such an argument cannot be

followed, so must be disregarded.
Defendant argues that plaintiff should not rely upon rules of
law relating to a rear end presumption derived from Boring v.
Bettner, 739 P.2d at 885 because it was overruled the following
year by Bettner. 764 P.2d at 829.
argument

Defendant's Brief p. 20. This

is insubstantial; although

it is true that Bettner

reversed the outcome of Boring, Bettner did not reject the rear-end
collision doctrine, but limited its application to situations
10

comparable to the present case, in which "the negligence followed
by the collision occurred while both vehicles were on the roadway
or shoulder, in relatively close proximity, and facing in the same
direction."

Bettner, 764 P. 2d at 834.

Plaintiff did not ignore

this obvious fact; because of the nature of Bettner's holding, it
was not pertinent to her argument so she did not deem it to be
necessary to point it out.
Further, plaintiff's purpose in citing to Bettner was not that
the particular facts in Bettner were the same as the present facts
and, thereby, suggested the same conclusion, but to outline the
principles of the rear-end collision doctrine set forth in the
case.

Because the facts in Bettner are dissimilar to the present

facts, the specific application of the Bettner holding does not
apply, even though the general principles of law outlined therein
are applicable.

Defendant's argument set forth on p. 22 of his

brief is, therefore, irrelevant to the issues at hand.
Defendant cites to Saliman v. Silk, 194 P. 2d 304 (Colo. 1948)
for the proposition that "[W]hen it can, with equal reasonableness,
be inferred that the accident in question was due to another cause
then [sic] the negligence of the defendant, the doctrine cannot be
invoked."

Defendants Brief p. 21. First, Saliman is completely

factually inapposite, dealing with a situation in which a steel
door fell upon the head of the plaintiff while he was making a
delivery to the defendant's store. Further, it is a very old case,
(1948), which has been superceded by current Utah law:

11

Before a plaintiff is entitled to a jury instruction on
res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must have presented
evidence that the occurrence of the incident is "more
probably than not caused by negligence." The plaintiff
need not eliminate all possible inferences of nonnegligence, but the balance of probabilities must weigh
in favor of negligence, or res ipsa loquitur does not
apply.
Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co.. 821 P.2d 458, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(citation omitted)

(emphasis in original).

Further, "for the

plaintiff to establish res ipsa loquitur, he need not eliminate all
other possible causes beyond a reasonable doubt," including a
sudden emergency."

Boring, 739 P.2d at 885.

Defendant suggests that Bettner does not support plaintiff's
position, citing some language from Bettner:

"[T]he fact that one

car hits another from the rear does not entitle one to any
instruction, whether considering a presumption of negligence or a
normal res ipsa loquitur instruction. Instead, the court must look
to the circumstances of the accident to determine if someone other
than the defendant, including the plaintiff, might be negligent."
Defendant's Brief p. 21.

The cited language, in fact, is very

consistent with plaintiff's position that the plaintiff carries the
burden

of

showing

that

the

rear-end

collision

doctrine

is

applicable to his or her situation, particularly taken together
with the rest of the case.
Defendant states that "[p]laintiff's only argument in the
case at bar is that since defendant's vehicle made contact with the
rear

of

plaintiff's

vehicle,

he

[sic]

is

entitled

to

an

instruction," and that "the cases cited by plaintiff in her brief
12
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evidence

-*ny circumstances."
•<;•-.,
m a t p i a inti i t w a s

negligent. Plaintiff, however, presented evidence that she was not
negligent.

The entitlement to an instruction on the theory of

one's case does not rest upon whether or not evidence is contested,
or even upon whether the jury believed one party's evidence or not.
It is based upon whether or not evidence is adduced to present the
elements of one's theory of the case.

Because plaintiff presented

all of the elements necessary to justify her requested instruction,
the instruction should have been given.

Failure to give it was

reversible error.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO PRESENT AN
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT THEORY TO THE JURY.
Please refer to plaintiffs

related to this issue.

brief

in chief

for

arguments

Plaintiffs Brief pp. 28-33.

III. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A
ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL.

JUDGMENT

NOV

OR,

IN

THE

Defendant sets forth Utah law on the requirement that a party
appealing from an evidentiary determination marshall the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings.
Plaintiff

Defendant's Brief p. 30.

does not disagree with the basic principles of

law

outlined by defendant, but disagrees with defendant's appplication
of

the

law.

Plaintiff

did,

in fact, marshall

the evidence.

Plaintiff not only set forth the facts surrounding the incident
from her point of view but, as fairly as possible, from defendant's
point of view, also.

Plaintiff made the attempt to be as thorough

and exhaustive as possible in presenting both parties' versions of
the facts short of reproducing every phrase and sentence of the
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HA

[q]uite a ways' ahead ot herf -ne

saw a bra] ::e li ght and became concerned " so began to s] ow dm /n

center lane.

IE ] a int i f f' s Br ief p

Defend'-^t notes l-b^* plaint
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driver behind h ^

5
4

* "-*
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str IMV someone/' tnat sftp was worried * - - : *
<- « e e * «*v

mi.-jh? nr-,+ **,
' II

iI

:i 5

". Ill

~avx wiau one was
'

4)

Defendant alleges that plaintiff did not indicate that

defendant was "a football field" behind her and that he had slowed
down to five to ten miles per hour by the time he reached her.
Defendants Brief p. 6.

In fact, plaintiff did note that defendant

stated that he was that far behind plaintiff when he first saw her,
and

also

noted

other,

inconsistent

Plaintiffs Brief p. 7 n. 5.

testimony

on

the

issue.

Further, defendant did not give

consistent testimony as to the speed he was travelling; plaintiff
has noted his various versions of his speed.

Plaintiff's Brief p.

8.
5)

Defendant

alleges

that

plaintiff

did

not

note

that

"[d]efendant felt that if the plaintiff had pushed on the gas,
there would have been no accident whatsoever."
p. 6.

Defendant's Brief

Plaintiff, in fact, stated that "[h]e realized

going to hit if she didn't push on her gas.'"

A

we were

Plaintiff's Brief p.

8.
Many of the facts that allegedly were not marshalled

are

redundant or irrelevant:
1)

Defendant asserts that plaintiff failed to note that she

was nervous prior to the accident and was "paranoid" while driving
and did not like driving.
note

that

she

felt

Defendant's Brief p. 3.

concerned

prior

to

the

Plaintiff did

accident

extremely frightened at the time of the accident.

and

was

Plaintiff's

Brief pp. 5-6.

Plaintiff's nervousness or lack thereof does not

establish,

any

in

way,

her

negligence
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or

lack

thereof.

A e i M i i i ill i mi in I v , 11 I mi i I mi I I "' « Itj i lut u l-o mention this

fact does not

constitute a faiJur'e to marshall evidence in favor of the trial
c o u r t ' s judgment.
T

'-•-_ -irnony on some

facts * -

inconsistent

dn^ ;ontradictory.

was, likewise, inconsistent

Defendant's

/-^tradictcr

plaintiff
Some

i n e ! on pages
of

the

testimony
pertit

'

1 a ct s

.u.

-: *. o e t, ; ^ r 11,

* trough

inconsistencies

note^

*

^^fordar*
. ~: ~.

are
ne parties
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or example, plaint :rf/q f-r<-+-; r ~ r ^
respri "I

w,

.

I i

,. * U ^ . M t J iiul

directly probative of tu : n e y n g e n c e 01
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- --+ iirorv cr

*PPH^^»

v

nereol
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is ot nc significance.
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'tit-
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collision w^ immediate! y prior to xt ax " A
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I ,
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4)

Whether

or

not

defendant

was

necessarily an important fact, either.

in

a

hurry

is

not

Defendant's Brief p. 6.

The extent of the damage resulting from the collision is of no
relevance to the issues of liability raised in plaintiff's brief.
Accordingly,

plaintiff

did

not

deal

with

these

facts.

Nevertheless, defendant claims that failure to make note of such
facts is a failure to marshall facts.

Such a claim does not have

merit.
In fact, plaintiff did a thorough job of marshalling the
evidence

in favor of defendant, and defendant's arguments

are

without merit.
As discussed in plaintiff's principal brief, the evidence at
trial supports her position.

The alleged non-marshalled

facts

were, to the extent relevant, marshalled by plaintiff.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING DEFENDANT
COSTS.
A.

Defendant Failed To Show That The Costs Requested Were
Necessarily Incurred.

Defendant correctly observes that plaintiff seeks a reversal
of the existing status of Utah case law on this subject, including
that by the Utah Supreme Court.

If plaintiff does not raise this

issue before this Court, she cannot take it before the Utah Supreme
Court.

Further, plaintiff initially filed this appeal before the

Utah Supreme Court, which subsequently poured it over to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff does not dispute that the authority
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ciLei,' i ,

leteii'Jl nil1. Lull, loii.li Lhw law a s p r e s e n t l y appl led; s h e

seeks a change? in this interpretation.
B.

The Deposition Costs
P r o p e r l y Supported,

Awarded

Defendant

l iciu M o t

U n d e r t h e p r e s e n t Utah p r a c t i c e • " [d ] epos it i on or msf :,;=; ai p. i u > t ;
i u u j w i 1 1 iili 11
taken

• ••» I ess t! le

i in good

appeared

t,r i a,J cour t i s per suaded

faitl 1 c .1 1 ::l

:i 1 1

the

light

of

that they w e r e

the

circumstances,

be essential for the deve] opment and presentati 01: 1 ::: f

t :-,. • . •
(quoting

Ames v. Maas, 8 16 P 2 1 168
Frampton

v. Wilson,

? j: j: • .1 993)

1 7 5 (Utal i Ct

60 5 P 2d

7 73

7>4

(Utah

1 98 0)) ,

"Deposition costs are reasonably necessary \ 0 thin the meaning of
e 1: 1= I::l 1 = ::: :>mpl ex 11: :ia bi 11: e ::: f the case p r e v e n t s a
p a r t y from c o m p l e t i n g discovery through less e x p e n s i v e m e t h o d s such
as i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , r e q u e s t s for admi ssion,
I " *:! : " .umei its •

and r e q u e s t s for t h e

A m e s , 8 16 I 2 i 1 t, b 1 3 5 (quoting M o r g a n

M o r g a n , /b>5 P. 2d 6 8 4 , 68 7 (Utah c t . I q >{ >

1 990)).

Plaintiff does

n o t d i s p u t e t h a t thi s i s t h e p r e s e n t state of t h e l a w , b u t ca] Ill 5
t 111 11 1 • :: J 1, au: 1 i <=i ] i in i 1 1a bi ::::>! 1 :::: f tl: 1 = • ieposi t:i on, cost, e x c e p t i o n

I 1: in ""

to Utah R , C"i \

II" 54 (d) ,

Defendant notes that the Morgan court "i: <= .manded (not r e v e r s e d )
I' IIP

1 i'- in

I

I•

I

I:::,l: 1, =

b r :i a .]

• ::: :::: i IJI : 1:

deposition costs were reasonably necessary

"

t :::: ie bermine

Defendant's Brief p.

T h i s position supports p] aintiff's argument
determ •
court

teji

*
Lao

'oni iu^or\

if the

T h e remand t o

• : : •, .Ill: , J • 1 j[i : a bi ..• L U : .
allegations

presented

award of costs were inadequate to justify
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i t.

-u"

to "justify
'

" '

-prgan
\-

"In our review of the record, we cannot determine if the trial
judge concluded that the deposition fees were reasonably necessary.
In the findings and conclusions and decree, the deposition costs
were simply awarded as part of the overall attorney fees, without
consideration of their necessity."

Morgan. 795 P.2d at 687.

The current state of Utah law also requires that "[t]he award
of costs should be narrowly made to guard against abuse by those
better financially equipped lest costs of seeking justice become
prohibitive

for

the

financially

ill

equipped."

Highland

Construction Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. . 683 P.2d 1042, 1051
(Utah 1984) .

It further requires, in an attempt to make such

awards on a narrow basis, that the claiming party carry the burden
of proof in establishing that deposition costs are necessary and
reasonable.

Id.

Defendant has done nothing but submit a bald,

unsupported bill of costs, having utterly failed to provide any
sort of statement or argument to the trial court that such costs
were reasonable or necessary.

The trial court has made absolutely

no finding that defendant's claimed costs were justified, aside
from the bald order granting costs, or that defendant carried his
burden of proof.

Defendant, therefore, should not prevail on this

issue.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's verdict finding defendant not negligent and the trial
court's order taxing costs against plaintiff.
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Plaintiff

also

requests a i ie i ».: t r l a l oi :i the issues of I labll i ty and damages, and an
award of costs incurred I i i bringing this appeal.
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ADDENDUM
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rul*
directed
notwithstanding the verdict.

Rule

50-

Motion

for

a

~J

"'-

judgment

(a) notion for a directed verdict; when made; effect.
A
party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence
offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the
motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do
and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made.
A
motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver
of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved
for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state
the specific ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting
a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of
the jury.
(to)
Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all
the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court
is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a
later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion.
Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or if a directed
verdict was not returned such party, within ten days after the jury
has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his
motion for a directed verdict
A motion for a new trial may be
joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the
alternative.
.: a verdict was returned the court may allow the
judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new
trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict
had been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct
the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed
or may order a new trial
(c)

Same:

Conditional r ulings on, grant of motion.
f

f: the mot i on: i f ::: r j udg men t i : z t v i i i, o c «i ia x J i^. i. • verdi
.-vided for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is
granted, the court shall also rule on the motion for a .
trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted ±i
the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall
specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a
new trial.
If the motion for a new tri a] :i s tlii 1. =
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conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the
finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new trial
has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court
has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has
been conditionally denied, the respondent on appeal may assert
error in that denial; and if the judgment is reversed on
appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the
order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than ten days
after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on
that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a
new trial in the event the appellate court concludes that the trial
court erred in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in
this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to
determine whether a new trial shall be granted.
Rule 51.

Instructions to jury; objectons.

At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that
the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or
otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are to be
given in writing, all objections thereto must be made before the
instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be
made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction
unless he objects thereto.
In objecting to the giving of an
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the
foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and
in the interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to
give an instruction.
Opportunity shall be given to make
objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the
court has instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the
24

evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the evidence,
it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of
all questions of fact
Rule 54.

Judgments; costs.

(

(] )
To whom awarded.
Except when, express provision
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs
of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final
determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah,
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extentpermitted by ] aw,
(2) How assessed, The party who claims his costs must
within five days after the entry of ji ldg ment serve upon the
adverse party against whom, costs are, claimed, a copy of a
memorandum
of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and, file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements
have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding.
A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven
days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion
to have the bill of costs taxed by the court, I n which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdor at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the
entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served
and, filed on the date ji idgment is entered,,.
,rials; amendments of judgment.
rounds
Subject to a] 3 the provisions of Rule 61 , a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the pcirties and, on all or
part of the issues,- for any of the following causes; provided,
however, that on a ™ ~ *H.on for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a r-?w judgment:
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(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a
fair trial•
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to
them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict
or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7)

Error in law.

(b)
Time for motion.
A motion for a new trial shall be
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a
new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it
shall be supported by an affidavit.
Whenever motion for a new
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits.
The time within which the
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended
for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court
for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The
court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new
trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds
therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after
entry of the judgment.
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Utah Code Annotated 1993
§ 78-56-8. Transcripts — Impecunious defendant in criminal case - Transcript from electronic recordings.
(1)

(a) When a transcript has been ordered by the court, the fees
for transcribing shall be paid by the respective parties to
the action or proceeding in equal proportion, or in
proportions as the court orders. A transcript may not be
taxed as costs, unless the preparation of the transcript is
ordered either by a party or by the court. The reporter is
not required in any case to transcribe notes until the fees
for this are tendered, or a sufficient amount to cover the fee
is deposited in court.
(b) If the court determines that the defendant in a
criminal case is impecunious, the court shall order the
certified shorthand reporter to transcribe the notes requested
by the defendant. The cost of the transcribing shall be paid
under Section 77-56-5.

(2) Transcripts from electronic recordings produced by a
certified court transcriber are governed under this section, and
compensation is at the same rates as under Section 78-56-4.
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